Geared towards Conviction

If you ever doubted that the federal system is geared toward gaining convictions, read the quote below.  It appears in US v. Higdon, a ruling granting a petition for a writ of mandamus brought to the Third Circuit by the government, after a jury could not agree whether or not the defendant possessed a firearm.  During the trial, the judge essentially submitted an interrogatory to the jurors - the defendant had stipulated that he was a convicted felon and that the gun traveled in interstate commerce - the judge refused to inform the jury about the stipulations and instead instructed them they had to determine whether or not the defendant possessed a firearm.  Therefore, the only thing for the jury to determine was whether or not the defendant possessed a firearm.  The quote that bothered me in the context of the opinion was:

"Possession of a firearm is ordinarily not a crime, and the emotions and fervor surrounding efforts to restrict gun ownership are all too familiar to require citation. Therefore, it is quite likely that a juror would be concerned about prosecuting someone merely for possessing a firearm, particularly if the juror is a gun owner. Although no one other than the people on Higden's first jury can know why it deadlocked, common sense suggests that it may well have been because of concerns about convicting someone for simply possessing a gun. The fact that the first trial resulted in a hung jury also suggests that at least some of the jurors may have been confused about why Higden was on trial in the first place."

The problem is that the opinion went on to suggest that it would be error for the court to bifurcate a s. 922 trial (possession of a gun by a convicted felon), an issue the district judge had not ruled on.  That ruling, in light of the recognition above is quite extraordinary.

Think about it.  The appellate court found that the jury likely could not follow the judge's instructions to determine whether or not he possessed a firearm, because they had not been told the defendant was a convicted felon.  That is a particularly disturbing statement given the plethora of case law that says 'a jury is presumed to follow the instructions...'.  Essentially, the court recognizes that a jury would be less likely to convict if they are not told a defendant is a convicted felon, and they therefore must be told he is.  And yet, we have to deal with 404(b) case law every day that says a limiting instruction is sufficient.  Total B.S.

Rotten.